IBM®
Skip to main content
    Zurich Research Laboratory      Terms of use
 
 
 
     Home      Products      Services & solutions      Support & downloads      My account     
IBM Research

Data encryption and key management

Project overview

Storage systems have undergone a tremendous evolution in the past few years. Today, storage space is typically provided by complex networked systems, in which clients communicate with storage servers over a network. In the near future, networked storage systems will extend beyond the server room, and their security will become a prime concern. Many data storage systems will soon rely on cryptographic protection methods as a key technology.

Protecting "data at rest" in storage systems poses new challenges compared to protecting "data in flight", which has been the focus of communication security for some time and is well understood today. One notable difference between these two problems is that a communication channel typically uses a streaming interface with FIFO characteristic, whereas a storage system must provide random access to small portions of the stored data. New techniques are needed for providing security in this context, in particular for protecting the integrity of stored data efficiently and for key management.

Methods for cryptographic storage protection are well known, but few have been widely used in practice. Concerns about the overhead involved have so far prevented their pervasive use. But new privacy regulations have recently been introduced that mandate encryption for certain environments; this explains why the industry is actively working on strong cryptographic protection methods for data storage systems.

An important aspect is key management. Keys have a lifecycle, just like the data they protect. We are working on novel and flexible methods to support this requirement.

 
Lazy revocation
   
 Publications    
[1] Roman Pletka and Christian Cachin. Cryptographic security for a high-performance distributed file system. Research Report RZ 3661, IBM Research, September 2006.
[2] Michael Backes, Christian Cachin, and Alina Oprea. Lazy revocation in cryptographic file systems. In Proc. 3rd Intl. IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, pages 1-11, December 2005.
[3] Michael Backes, Christian Cachin, and Alina Oprea. Secure key-updating for lazy revocation. In D. Gollmann, J. Meier, and A. Sabelfeld, editors, Proc. 11th European Symposium On Research In Computer Security (ESORICS), number 4189 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 327-346. Springer, 2006.
   
    back to top
     
    About IBM Privacy Contact