2005 Publications of the Network Security and Cryptography Group
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Michael Backes.
Quantifying probabilistic information flow in computational reactive systems.
In Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security (ESORICS), volume 3679 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 336-354. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, September
2005.
Michael Backes.
Real-or-random key secrecy of the Otway-Rees protocol via a symbolic security
proof.
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS), 2005.
To appear.
Michael Backes and Christian Cachin.
Public-key steganography with active attacks.
In Joe Kilian, editor, Proc. 2nd Theory of Cryptography Conference
(TCC), volume 3378 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 210-226. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, February 2005.
copyright Springer-Verlag, 2005.
Michael Backes, Christian Cachin, and Alina
Oprea.
Lazy revocation in cryptographic file systems.
In Proc. 3rd Intl. IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, December
2005.
Michael Backes, Jan Camenisch, and
Dieter Sommer.
Cryptographically secure anonymous access control with accountability.
In 4th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES),
Washington, Nov. 2005. ACM Press, 2005.
Michael Backes and Markus Dürmuth.
A cryptographically sound Dolev-Yao style security proof of an electronic
payment system.
In 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages
78-93. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2005.
Preliminary version [BaDu2004].
Michael Backes, Anupam Datta, Ante
Derek, John C. Mitchell, and Mathieu Turuani.
Compositional analysis of contract signing protocols.
In 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages
94-110. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2005.
Preliminary version [BDDMT2004].
Michael Backes and Thomas Groß.
Tailoring the Dolev-Yao abstraction to web service realities.
In ACM Secure Web Services Workshop (SWS), pages 65-74. ACM
Press, November 2005.
Michael Backes, Dennis Hofheinz,
Jörn Müller-Quade, and Dominique Unruh.
On fairness in simulatability-based cryptographic systems.
In 3rd ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering
(FMSE), pages 13-22, November 2005.
Michael Backes, Sebastian
Mödersheim, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Luca Viganó.
Symbolic and cryptographic analysis of the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
scenario.
Research Report RZ 3619 (#99629), IBM Research Division, July 2005.
(PDF)
Michael Backes and Birgit Pfitzmann.
Limits of the cryptographic
realization of Dolev-Yao-style XOR.
In Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security (ESORICS), volume 3679 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 178-196. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, September
2005.
Michael Backes and Birgit Pfitzmann.
Relating symbolic and cryptographic secrecy.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and
Privacy, pages 171-182, Oakland, CA, May 2005. IEEE Computer
Society, Technical Committee on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society
Press.
copyright IEEE, 2005.
Michael Backes and Birgit Pfitzmann.
Relating symbolic and cryptographic secrecy.
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
2(2):109-123, 2005.
Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and
Michael Waidner.
Justifying a Dolev-Yao model under active attacks.
In Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III: FOSAD 2004/2005
Tutorial Lectures, volume 3655 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 1-41. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, 2005.
Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and
Michael Waidner.
Reactively secure signature schemes.
International Journal of Information Security, 4(4):242-252,
October 2005.
Journal version of [BaPfWa2003b].
Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, and Victor
Shoup.
Random oracles in Constantinople: Practical asynchronous Byzantine
agreement using cryptography.
Journal of Cryptology, 18(3):219-246, 2005.
Preliminary version appears in Proc. 19th ACM Symposium on Principles of
Distributed Computing (PODC 2000).
Christian Cachin and Stefano Tessaro.
Asynchronous verifiable information dispersal.
In Proc. 24th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS
2005), pages 191-202, October 2005.
Christian Cachin and Stefano Tessaro.
Brief Announcement: Asynchronous verifiable information dispersal.
In Pierre Fraigniaud, editor, Proc. 19th International Conference on
Distributed Computing (DISC 2005), September 26-29, 2005, Cracow,
Poland, volume 3724 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 503-504. Springer, 2005.
Christian Cachin and Stefano Tessaro.
Brief Announcement: Optimal resilience for erasure-coded Byzantine
distributed storage.
In Pierre Fraigniaud, editor, Proc. 19th International Conference on
Distributed Computing (DISC 2005), September 26-29, 2005, Cracow,
Poland, volume 3724 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 497-498. Springer, 2005.
Christian Cachin and Stefano Tessaro.
Optimal resilience for erasure-coded Byzantine distributed storage.
Research Report RZ 3575, IBM Research, February 2005.
(PDF)
Christopher Giblin, Alice Y. Liu,
Samuel Müller, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Xin Zhou.
Regulations expressed as logical models (REALM).
Research Report RZ 3616, IBM Research Division, July 2005.
(PDF)
Christopher Giblin, Alice Y. Liu,
Samuel Müller, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Xin Zhou.
Regulations expressed as logical models (REALM).
In 18th Annual Conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems
(JURIX 2005), pages 37-48. IOS Press, Amsterdam, December 2005.
copyright IBM, 2005.
(PDF)
Thomas Groß, Birgit Pfitzmann,
and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi.
Browser model for security analysis of browser-based protocols.
In Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security (ESORICS), volume 3679 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 489-508. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, September
2005.
Longer preliminary version [GPS05a].
Thomas Groß, Birgit Pfitzmann,
and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi.
Proving a WS-Federation Passive Requestor Profile with a browser model.
In ACM Secure Web Services Workshop (SWS), pages 54-64. ACM
Press, November 2005.
Windsor W. Hsu, Shauchi Ong, and Birgit
Pfitzmann.
Archiv mit Dokumentenversteinerung.
DIGMA -- Zeitschrift für Datenrecht und Informationssicherheit,
5(2):82-84, 2005.
Takeshi Imamura, Michiaki Tatsubori,
Yuichi Nakamura, and Christopher Giblin.
Web services security configuration in a service-oriented architecture.
In 14 International World Wide Web Conference (WWW2005), pages
1120-1121. ACM, May 2005.
(PDF)
Günter Karjoth, Birgit
Pfitzmann, Matthias Schunter, and Michael Waidner.
Service-oriented assurance -- comprehensive security by explicit assurances.
In First Workshop on Quality of Protection (QoP 2005).
Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, September 2005.
Post-conference proceedings to appear. Preproceedings version also as IBM
Research Report RZ 3625 (# ??) 08/15/05, IBM Research Division, Zurich, Sept
2005.
(PDF)
HariGovind V. Ramasamy and Christian Cachin.
Parsimonious asynchronous Byzantine-fault-tolerant atomic broadcast.
In Proc. OPODIS 2005 --- 9th Intl. Conference on Principles of
Distributed Systems, December 2005.