

7 Distributed Cryptography

7.1 Motivation

Distributed cryptography spreads the operation of a cryptosystem among a group of *servers* (*parties*) in a fault-tolerant way [Des94]. We consider the threshold failure model with n servers, of which up to t are faulty; such distributed cryptosystems are called *threshold cryptosystems*.

Distributed cryptosystems are based on *secret sharing* and are typically known only for public-key cryptosystems because of their “nice” algebraic properties. Here we consider a *public-key cryptosystem* and a *digital signature scheme*.

7.2 Secret Sharing

Secret sharing forms the basis of threshold cryptography. In a $(t + 1)$ -out-of- n *secret sharing scheme*, a secret s is shared among n parties such that the cooperation of at least $t + 1$ parties is needed to recover s . Any group of t or fewer parties should not get any information about s .

Algorithm 1. To share $s \in \mathbb{F}_q$, a dealer $P_d \notin \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ chooses uniformly at random a polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$ of degree t subject to $f(0) = s$, generates shares $s_i = f(i)$, and sends s_i to P_i for $i = 1, \dots, n$. To recover s among a group of $t + 1$ servers with indices \mathcal{S} , every server reveals its share and they publicly recover the secret by computing

$$s = f(0) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} \lambda_{0,i}^{\mathcal{S}} s_i,$$

where

$$\lambda_{0,i}^{\mathcal{S}} = \prod_{j \in \mathcal{S}, j \neq i} \frac{j}{j - i}$$

are the (easy-to-compute) Lagrange coefficients. The scheme has perfect security, i.e., the shares held by every group of t or fewer servers are statistically independent of s (as in a one-time pad).

Verifiable Secret Sharing. If the dealer P_d may also be faulty (i.e., malicious and actively deviating from the protocol), we need a *verifiable secret sharing (VSS)*, a fault-tolerant protocol to ensure that P_d distributes “consistent” shares, which define a unique secret. VSS is an important building block for secure multi-party computation.

Distributed Key Generation. There are also *distributed key-generation protocols (DKG)* for generating a public key and a sharing of the corresponding secret key. They must ensure that the corrupted parties learn no information about the secret key. Such protocols exist and have been implemented for the common public-key types, like discrete logarithm and RSA. Usually

they assume synchronous networks and passive adversaries. With weaker assumptions (active adversary), they are less practical, however.

7.3 Threshold ElGamal Encryption

Discrete Logarithms. Let $G = \langle g \rangle$ be a group of prime order q , such that g is a generator of G . The *discrete logarithm problem (DLP)* means, for a random $y \in G$, to compute $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ such that $y = g^x$. The *Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP)* is to compute $g^{x_1 x_2}$ from random $y_1 = g^{x_1}$ and $y_2 = g^{x_2}$.

It is conjectured that there exist groups in which solving the DLP and DHP is *hard*, for example, the multiplicative subgroup $G \subset \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ of order q , for some prime $p = mq + 1$ (recall that q is prime). For example, $|p| = 2048$ and $|q| = 256$ for 2048-bit discrete-logarithm-based cryptosystems, which is considered secure today. Using the language of complexity theory, to say that a problem is *hard* means that any *efficient* algorithm solves it only with *negligible* probability. (Formally, this is defined using complexity-theoretic notions [Gol04]: there is a *security parameter* k , an *efficient* algorithm is a probabilistic that runs in time bounded by a fixed polynomial in k , and a *negligible* function is smaller than any polynomial fraction.)

Public-key Cryptosystems. A *public-key cryptosystem* is a triple (K, E, D) of efficient algorithms. Algorithm K generates a pair of keys (pk, sk) . The encryption and decryption algorithms, E and D , have the property that for all (pk, sk) generated by K and for any plaintext message m , the probability that $D(sk, E(pk, m)) \neq m$ is negligible.

A public-key cryptosystem is *semantically secure* if no efficient adversary A can find two messages m_0 and m_1 such that A can distinguish their encryptions. More precisely, A runs in two stages and first outputs m_0 and m_1 ; then a random bit b is chosen and A is given $c = E(pk, m_b)$; A can distinguish encryptions if it can guess b from c correctly with more than negligible probability. Semantic security provides security against a *passive* adversary, but not against an *active* one.

ElGamal Encryption. The *ElGamal* cryptosystem is based on the Diffie-Hellman problem: Key generation chooses a random secret key $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computes the public key as $y = g^x$. The encryption of $m \in \{0, 1\}^k$ under public-key y is the tuple $(c_1, c_2) = (g^r, m \oplus H(y^r))$, computed using a randomly chosen $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and a hash function $H : G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$. The decryption of a ciphertext (c_1, c_2) is $\hat{m} = H(c_1^x) \oplus c_2$. One can easily verify that $\hat{m} = m$ because $c_1^x = g^{rx} = g^{x^r} = y^r$, and therefore, the argument to H is the same in encryption and decryption. The scheme is considered secure against passive adversaries. (For actually proving that breaking semantic security is as hard as solving the DHP, one has to use the random-oracle model.)

Threshold ElGamal Encryption. The following $(t + 1)$ -out-of- n threshold ElGamal cryptosystem tolerates the passive corruption of $t < n/2$ parties.

Let the secret key x be *shared* among P_1, \dots, P_n using a polynomial f of degree t over \mathbb{Z}_q such that P_i holds a share $x_i = f(i)$. The global public key $y = g^x$ is known to all parties, and encryption proceeds as in standard ElGamal above. For decryption, a client sends a decryption request containing c_1, c_2 to all servers. Upon receiving a decryption request, server P_i computes

a *decryption share* $d_i = c_1^{x_i}$ and sends it to the client. Upon receiving decryption shares from a set of $t + 1$ servers with indices \mathcal{S} , the client computes the message as

$$m = H\left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} d_i^{\lambda_{0,i}^{\mathcal{S}}}\right) \oplus c_2.$$

This works because

$$\prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} d_i^{\lambda_{0,i}^{\mathcal{S}}} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} c_1^{x_i \lambda_{0,i}^{\mathcal{S}}} = c_1^{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} x_i \lambda_{0,i}^{\mathcal{S}}} = c_1^x$$

from the properties of Algorithm 1. Note that the decryption operation only requires the cooperation of $n - t$ servers.

This is an example of a *non-interactive* threshold cryptosystem, as no interaction among the parties is needed. It can also be made robust, i.e., secure against an active adversary [SG02]. Such threshold cryptosystems can easily be integrated in asynchronous distributed systems; but many threshold cryptosystems are only known under the stronger assumption of *synchronous* networks with broadcast.

7.4 Threshold RSA Signatures

Threshold versions of the RSA cryptosystem and the RSA signature scheme are more difficult to obtain than for discrete-logarithm-based schemes. The reason is that the order of the group, from which the secret exponents are drawn, must not be revealed.

Digital Signature Schemes. A digital signature scheme is a triple $(\mathbf{K}, \mathbf{S}, \mathbf{V})$ of efficient algorithms. The *key generation* algorithm \mathbf{K} outputs a public key/private key pair (pk, sk) . The signing algorithm \mathbf{S} takes as input the private key and a message m , and produces a signature σ . The verification algorithm \mathbf{V} takes the public key, a message m , and a putative signature σ , and outputs a bit that indicates whether it accepts or rejects the signature. The signature is *valid* for the message when \mathbf{V} accepts. All signatures produced by the signing algorithm must be valid.

A digital signature scheme is secure against *existential forgery* if no efficient adversary A can output any message together with a valid signature that was not produced by the legitimate signer. Formally, A is given pk and is allowed to request signatures on a sequence of messages of its choice, where any message may depend on previously obtained signatures. If A can output a message whose signature it never requested, then the adversary has successfully *forged* a signature. A signature scheme is *secure* if any efficient A can forge a signature only with negligible probability.

RSA Signatures. Let $N = pq$ be the product of two primes of approximately equal length. For example, $|p| = |q| \approx 1024$ in the case of RSA with 2048 bits, which is considered secure today. The group \mathbb{Z}_N^* has order $\varphi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$; it is believed that the only way to compute $\varphi(N)$ requires knowledge of the prime factorization of N . The specification of the scheme includes a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.

Algorithm \mathbf{K} chooses two random primes p and q and a (potentially fixed) prime e . Then it computes $N = pq$ and $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(N)}$, and outputs $sk = d$ and $pk = (N, e)$.

To sign a message m , algorithm \mathbf{S} computes $\sigma = H(m)^d$ in \mathbb{Z}_N^* , i.e., modulo N . The verification algorithm tests if a signature σ is valid for a message m by checking whether $\sigma^e \stackrel{?}{=} H(m)$ in \mathbb{Z}_N^* .

Threshold RSA Signatures. Given the number-theoretic structure of RSA, one cannot perform interpolation “in the exponent” as in the discrete-log setting because the order of the group, $\varphi(N)$, must remain secret.

A simple n -out-of- n threshold signature scheme can be obtained nevertheless, by using *additive sharing* of the private key over the *integers*. It provides security against a passive adversary. The dealer chooses random $d_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $d \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \pmod{\varphi(N)}$. In order not to reveal information about d or $\varphi(N)$, the d_i are chosen with bit length significantly larger than d , e.g., $|d_i| \approx |d| + 160$. This method hides d statistically.

To set up the scheme, the dealer generates an RSA key pair and shares d among P_1, \dots, P_n over the integers, such that P_i receives d_i .

To sign a message m , a client sends the request to all servers; a server P_i computes a *signature share* $\sigma_i = H(m)^{d_i}$ and returns σ_i to the client. From n received signature shares, the client computes the signature $\sigma = \prod_{i=1}^n \sigma_i$ in \mathbb{Z}_N . Note that

$$\sigma = \prod_{i=1}^n \sigma_i = \prod_{i=1}^n H(m)^{d_i} = H(m)^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i} = H(m)^d$$

because $d \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \pmod{\varphi(N)}$. Verification is the same as with ordinary RSA signatures.

The drawback of this scheme is that the cooperation of *all* n servers is required for signing because *additive* sharing is used. Nevertheless, it is also possible to use a polynomial sharing and to obtain a truly fault-tolerant RSA-based threshold signature scheme. Shoup’s scheme [Sho00, GHKR08], for example, is robust, i.e., secure against an active adversary, and is also non-interactive, which makes it suitable for use in asynchronous distributed systems.

References

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